Matthew J. Robertson
Matthew J. Robertson
[8] Value-dependent Spite in First-price All-pay Auctions, Review of Economic Design, Accepted
[7] Interdependent-value Auctions with Spiteful Bidders, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
[6] A Tractable Theory of Value-dependent Spite in First- and Second-price Auctions, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 123 (2026) (ungated pdf)
[4] Procurement with Competing Insiders, Economics Letters, Vol. 250 (2025)
[3] Competitive Outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock Contest, Economics Letters, Vol. 250 (2025)
[2] Sequential Elimination in Multi-stage All-pay Auctions, Economics Letters, Vol. 241 (2024)
[1] Unobservable Costly Effort in Security Design, Economics Letters, Vol. 235 (2024)